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Encounter with Disaster:
A Medical Diary of Hiroshima, 1945
AVERILL A. LIEBOW
Dr. Liebow was Professor ofPathology at Yalefrom 1946 through 1968.
Thereafter he was Professor ofPathology at the University ofCalifornia,
San Diego, until his death in 1978.
Condensed from the original publication, The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 38: 61-239, 1965
The effects of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 are described.
Immediately after the bombing, Japanese civilian and military authorities mobilized an intense
effort to provide help to the damaged cities and their inhabitants. At the same time, research
was undertaken by the Japanese in an attempt to determine the nature of the effects of the
bombs on the population. Some weeks later, the American armed services and the Manhattan
District also organized an investigation of these effects. This memoir describes the early days
of the American research effort, its integration with the Japanese program, and the develop-
ment of a Joint Commission to study the effects of the bombing. After the first rapid survey,
described in this paper, the effort was reorganized and continued under the sponsorship of the
National Research Councils ofAmerica and Japan as the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission.
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of atomic weapons into warfare at Hiroshima on August 6,
1945, permanently altered the implications of armed combat between nations. Ever
since that day the possibility of nuclear attack has obsessed the strategic planning of
all nations. In 1982, powerful forces are pressing for expansion of military nuclear
power on the one hand, and for plans to reduce nuclear armaments on the other. In-
ternational movements among physicians have emphasized the anticipated total
breakdown of medical services after nuclear attack, and the consequent impotence
ofthe medical establishment. Health professionals ofboth the East and West are at-
tempting to persuade the political decision makers that the breakdown of medical
support after a nuclear attack would be so widespread that even the ordinary
measures of sanitation and first aid would be virtually destroyed for long enough to
cause a high rate of disability in the target population from malnutrition, infection,
and the consequences of"ordinary" trauma, in addition to the widely publicized ef-
fects of radiation.
It is not necessary to imagine these effects. Hiroshima shows clearly what happened
in a small town subjected to a single small bomb which produced virtually no
residual radiation in the bombed area. At Hiroshima and later at Nagasaki, the
damage was localized and external medical support was available. The results of
more widespread attacks can be visualized simply by considering what might have
happened at Hiroshima if it had been impossible to obtain medical support within
the first few hours from Japanese and, some days later, from American military
medical organizations.
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kept by Dr. Averill Liebow during the period shortly after the bombing of
Hiroshima, when he was sent to that city as part of an American medical task force
assigned to collaborate with the Japanese physicians in undertaking a study of the
medical effects ofthe bomb. This effort ultimately led, in 1948, to the establishment
ofthe Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, ajoint effort ofJapanese and American
scientists supported by both the Japanese and American governments, which carried
out highly productive studies ofthe effect ofthe bomb on the health and genetic in-
tegrity of the victims of the blast. Dr. Liebow's diary gives a clear picture of the
nature ofthe damage created by the blast, ofthe way in which support was mobilized
for the survivors, and of the initial steps in studying the effects of the bombs. The
Yale Journal has decided to reprint a portion of the diary (somewhat edited to
reduce emphasis on personal details) in the hope that those who read it today will at-
tempt to translate this experience into the vastly greater threat of our time. What
follows is considerably condensed from the original. In addition, a small amount of
referenced material has been added when it could provide a more quantitative in-
dication of the situation than Liebow provided in his diary.
PHILIP K. BONDY, M.D.
Editor-in-Chief, The YaleJournalofBiology andMedicine
Dr. Liebow's Diary:
HIROSHIMA RETROSPECT
Hiroshima ("broad island") is really a delta cut into six islands by the branches of
the River Ota. Here lived some 250,000 people, plus an encampment of soldiers of
the Chugoku Army near the center. The hills rise sharply on two sides of the delta,
which points its apex to the north. It is as if a great flatiron had been pressed from
the direction ofthe seainto the mountains. Onlythetruncated cone ofHijiyama ris-
ing to 70 meters in the southeast sector interrupts the flatness.
Most ofthe houses were oftraditional Japanese construction, consisting ofone or
two stories and built of wooden lathwork and clay. A central heavy tree beam runs
longitudinally supporting arch-like ties, which support a lattice of struts that brace
the heavy roof of overlapping pantiles. Most of the modern buildings were of the
heavy construction necessitated in this land of earthquakes. These were situated
along the main street at the southern boundary ofthe military encampment and also
along the broad thoroughfare which ran at right angles directly south from the main
entry ofthe reservation. These buildings were not in acluster, but were separated by
rows of wooden shops and dwellings. There were few buildings of weight-bearing
brick since these are the most subject to damage by earthquake. Typical Japanese
cities built in this fashion tend to be swept by disastrous fires at an average interval
of about eight years, but the ordinary houses, quick to burn, can as quickly be
rebuilt. The open charcoal braziers (hibachi) useful for warmth and cooking are a
constant hazard. In this city of islands the branches of the Ota made natural fire
breaks, but the separate islands were themselves large and densely crowded. In
recognition ofthe danger of fire, especially under air attack, the citizens even before
April 1945 had organized patriotic working parties (Giyutai) to create additional fire
breaks by leveling blocks of homes. Work parties for this purpose were recruited
also from outlying villages such as Otake.
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Hiroshima was not an important center ofindustry. On the outskirts were a branch
of Toyo industries, Mitsubishi shipyards, and a machine-tool factory. The Japan
Steel Company was to the northeast. There were also two large rayon plants, one
located at Ujina on the far end ofthe easternmost island near the harbor. It was here
that patients were later brought under the care ofthe Tokyo First (DaiIchi) Military
Hospital and where we were to establish the headquarters for our work. Industry
was also scattered in innumerable home workshops in accordance with the Japanese
concept of total war.
In a roughly pentagonal area near the center of Hiroshima was concentrated the
military power of central Japan. The headquarters of the Second Grand Army and
of the Chugoku Military District were located near an ornate castle, a relic of the
Tokugawas, on an artificial island surrounded by a moat. Near the southwestern
part of the pentagon were divisional headquarters and barracks, row on row. The
impressive Gokoku shrine stood near the entrance of the encampment facing the
boulevard at its southern border. The Hiroshima encampment had served as the
springboard for the conquest of Manchuria in 1937-45 and before that for the suc-
cessful attack on Port Arthur. Of late, the military importance of this center had
waned and it was serving largely the function of a quartermaster depot. Ordnance
and munitions were stored in caves along the road leading to the naval bases ofKure
to the north and Iwakuni to the south.
In a military sense at least, the army base might be considered a legitimate target,
yet it was strange that before August 1945 Hiroshima had escaped almost unharmed.
Desultory raids between the middle of March and the 30th of April 1945 had in-
flicted almost no damage. During the early summer our propaganda had broadcast
threats that a number of cities, including Hiroshima, would be destroyed. The
population was tense in expectation. Yet on August 6, the element of surprise was
complete. Four B-29 bombers were sighted over Hiroshima early in the morning but
shortly after 7:00 A.M. they withdrew to the northwest. Just after 8:00 three planes
returned, but the all-clear had sounded 45 minutes before. Since there was no large
concentration of hostile aircraft, the people went about their business as they had
been told. At that moment Hiroshima was a city going to work. Farmers were
already in the fields on the outskirts of the city. The streets were filled. Children had
already reported to the schools or for service in clearing fire breaks. Customers had
arrived in the banks but had not as yet been admitted to the floor. It was atimewhen
the hazard of direct exposure in the open was close to its peak.
One of the planes was seen to release several objects by parachute and then at
8:14, despite the brightness of the morning, survivors were startled by a prolonged
and brilliant flash like that of a gigantic magnesium flare. Accompanying the flash
of light was an instantaneous flash of heat traveling with the speed of light and
perceptible as far away as Ninoshima, the beautiful conical island five miles across
Hiroshima Bay. The heat affected exposed objects with an intensity inversely pro-
portional to the square ofthe distance from theepicenter. Its duration was probably
less than one-tenth of a second and its intensity was sufficient to cause nearby flam-
mable objects, particularly when dark, to burst into flame and to char poles as far as
3,600 meters away from the hypocenter. At 550-650 meters it was sufficient to chip
and roughen granite by unequal expansion ofits components. Theheat also produced
bubbling of tile to about 1,100 meters. It has been found by experiment that to pro-
duce this effect a temperature of 1,800°C acting for four seconds is necessary, but
under these laboratory conditions the effect is deeper, which indicates that the
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temperature was higher and the duration less during the Hiroshima explosion. Only
directly exposed surfaces sustained flash burns; intervening objects prevented the
charring or other alteration in the directly exposed surfaces and thereby cast
"shadows." The sharpness of shadows cast by constantly moving objects like leaves
also suggest the brief duration of the flash. Thousands of persons in the open within
a radius of 4 km sustained more or less severe flash burns depending on distance
and the protective effect of clothing.
After an interval evident to those at a distance came a violent shock wave that flat-
tened the fragile wooden buildings. As seen from the hills the houses fell as under a
scythe. People were hurled from where they were standing. Those closest-by heard
almost no sound except for that of falling buildings, but at a distance there was a
rumbling roar like that of thunder. The blast wave shot outwards at approximately
three km per second for a relatively short distance, but then after several yards fell
to the speed of sound (approximately 1,000 meters/second). It rose to a sharp peak,
and then the pressure fell below atmospheric for a period perhaps three times that of
the positive blast. Objects at a distance were deflected away from the center of the
blast, but such objects as trees immediately beneath remained standing upright
although stripped of branches. The magnitude of the downward pressure was shown
by "dishing" of the reinforced concrete roofs of buildings. Glass and other debris
shot through the air like bullets, often becoming impacted in wood and inflicting
multiple serious injuries. Simultaneously a roiling cloud, pink or black according to
various observers, rose from the point of the explosion; this together with immense
quantities of dust from the ground and from the collapsing buildings, threw those
beneath it into almost total darkness, which lasted for some twenty minutes.
Thousands were trapped in the wreckage. Almost all of those who could not escape
under their own power perished. Fires beginning everywhere both by direct ignition
and by the upsetting of thousands of open hibachi, many still in use for cooking
breakfast, at once swept the city. A high wind sucked toward the rising atomic cloud
fanned the flames which then created their own fire storm. The human victims suf-
fered burns both by flash and by flame.
As soon as the atomic nature of the explosion was announced a new fear made
itself felt-the terror of the invisible. The existence of radiation effects was known
almost at once. People who had been close to the hypocenter but who had suffered
neither burns nor trauma sickened and died. They felt weak and nauseated, could
not eat, developed severe diarrhea and fever, and some died within ten days. Those
who survived longer lost their hair; hemorrhages and ulcers appeared in the skin and
mucous membranes, and death resulted from pulmonary or interstitial infections.
The marrow had been destroyed and all elements of the blood were depleted.
Ifthe intent ofthe bombing was demoralization, this was unquestionably achieved.
False rumors spread-that all who had been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki would die,
and that the cities would be uninhabitable for 75 years. But there was yet another ef-
fect. Those in power in Japan who were wise had clearly seen that the war had been
lost when Okinawa and Iwo Jima fell. The Emperor had personally sought to in-
fluence his war councilors to sue for peace. Now, in the face of unanticipated and
unprecedented power that could overwhelm even the most valorous, there was a way
to conclude the war without losing face-and the fighting was brought to an end.
Only glimpses can be obtained from accounts of survivors of the immense medical
problems created by an atomic explosion in a densely populated city. Those who lived
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were dazed not merely by the immediate force ofthe explosion but by its vast extent.
Many lost consciousness for a few seconds or minutes even though they had not suf-
fered trauma to the head. Darkness interrupted by onrushing fires added to the con-
fusion and terror. No one knew which way to escape. The river banks and their
waters were natural havens and were soon teeming. Boats were mobilized to carry
survivors upstream. Only a few could be brought out on litters or carts, and almost
all who could not rescue themselves were overwhelmed by the flames. Almost 75
percent of those who were within a radius of two km from the epicenter died in the
first day of trauma, blast, or heat damage. Both administrative authority and
organized activity had ceased to exist. What was done was on individual initiative.
Only three of45 hospitals in the city remained in partially functional condition (Fig.
1). The two largest and most modern, the Red Cross Hospital and the Communica-
tions Department ("Post Office') Hospital, were so severely damaged by blast, as
was their equipment, that they could function only as first-aid stations. Less than
ten percent of the city's 300 physicians were uninjured and nursing strength was
equally depleted, over 90 percent of the 1,800 nurses and orderlies in the city before
the bomb having been either killed or injured. Moreover, although about 85 percent
of the medical supplies remained intact, the quantity available was much too small
to meet the needs of the injured [1].
N
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FIG. 1. Diagrammatic map of Hiroshima showing the location of the major hospitals (solid dots),
hypocenter (cross) and location of the Joint Commission Headquarters (U). Circles have been drawn at
500-meter intervals from the hypocenter. The shaded area delineates the zone in which physical destruc-
tion was complete. Almost all of the people within this region were killed outright or died within a few
weeks.
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THE EARLY MEDICAL RESPONSE
As the fires cooled relief work began. The first reliefstation from outside was set
up on the afternoon ofAugust 6 at Tamon in the shelter of Hijiyama. By August 7,
approximately 2,200 civil defense workers had moved into the city, and 33 emergency
clinics were established, manned by 150 physicians [1]. Thousands streamed back
into the city in search of relatives and friends. Messages were scrawled on the walls
of the aid stations. During this time, ambulances and automobiles could not move
because the streets were blocked with debris, which was removed only slowly.
Police control, by tradition an enveloping power in Japan, was resumed with the
help of 200 officers from neighboring towns. The Armed Forces gave substantial
aid. On August 7, two relief parties were dispatched from the naval base at nearby
Kure and the hospital on the base at Iwakuni received 51 patients, many of whom
were naval personnel who had been quartered at the Banker's Club, a large building
only 200 meters from the hypocenter. Some of these persons died in the first days
purely of radiation effect. The Army assumed responsibility for the care of civilian
as well as military casualties although the two large Army Hospitals on the military
reservation had been destroyed. Military hospital detachments were brought in from
elsewhere. By August 9, the Second Army Hospital had entered the city. This unit
was to treat 15,000 injured persons within the next two weeks [1]. Accessory aid sta-
tions were established in certain buildings on the outskirts that had survived com-
plete destruction, and in adjacent communities as at Oshiba. One of the most active
in the city itself was at the Fukuramachi School. The Red Cross Hospital, despite
severe damage to its fine building, took care of 1,000 persons as inpatients, and in
addition conducted outpatient clinics. According to the director, Dr. Hachiya, the
Post Office Hospital began to receive patients by 9:00 A.M. of August 7, and by the
end of that day 400 had been given immediate care. A major installation was
established on August 25 by the Tokyo Dai Ichi Military Hospital (the "Walter
Reed" of Japan) at the living quarters ofthe Daiwa Rayon Mill onUjina-later to be
the base of operations of the Joint Commission. During the first two weeks over
30,000 bodies were counted and cremated, many without being identified [1].
INITIAL JAPANESE INVESTIGATIONS
The investigation of the effects of the atomic bomb was begun by the Japanese as
early as the first day following the explosion when Professor Nishina, a quantum
physicist, came to Hiroshima. A week later, on August 14, Dr. Koichi Murachi, a
senior biophysicist of the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research at Tokyo,
came with associates. With the aid of a Neher cosmic ray counter they found a zone
of gamma-ray activity approximately ten times background in a region 50 meters
across at the hypocenter. This was interpreted to be the result of activation by
neutrons of components on the ground. The radioactivity was far below hazardous
levels. It is interesting to note that part of this cosmic ray counter had been made
and tested before the war by Professor Neher himself in the United States. At
Takasu to the south and west there was radioactivity of three times background
level. It was interpreted to represent the effect of fallout directed by the wind that
had blown from the east and by the rains that fell in this region just after the explo-
sion. This activity was extremely low and certainly did not justify the fear of the
rumor mongers. Dr. Murachi died in 1964 of leukemia.
The physicists also noted the "shadows" cast on various objects as a result of the
heat flash. By sighting along these shadows they were able to establish through a
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process of triangulation the position of the explosion. It is amusing that this datum,
widely known among scientists in Japan in the second week of August, was con-
sidered a secret in the United States for many months.
Medical investigations were begun at once and some of the earliest autopsies were
performed at the Iwakuni Naval Hospital. At the Communications Department
Hospital careful records were kept of approximately 150 patients, and autopsies
were performed by Professor Tamagawa of Okayama University in a makeshift
autopsy room on the grounds of the institution. The Prefectural Hospital at Kusatsu
was active until November 1945. Autopsies were performed there by Professor
Araki of the Kyoto Prefectural University. Patients were transferred to military
hospitals at Okayama and elsewhere and to civilian institutions and hospitals as far
away as Osaka and even Tokyo. In these settings investigative work and necropsies
were also performed.
One of the most important investigative units was that maintained by the superbly
staffed Tokyo Dai Ichi Military Hospital at Ujina. It had been customary for many
of the best young Japanese physicians from the major universities to be recruited
into the military soon after receiving their medical degrees. Of this group, Majors
Motohashi, Misono, and Hata later made valuable contributions to the work of the
Joint Commission. In addition, they had collaborated with physicians of the Tokyo
Imperial University who had sent investigating groups into Hiroshima and had also
received materials for study at the University in Tokyo. A report concerning 712 of
these patients was completed by personnel of the Tokyo Dai Ichi Military Hospital
and represents an important original document.
A major tragedy was suffered by the highly competent group of investigators
headed by Professor Mashita of the Kyoto Imperial University. They took up
residence at the Ono Army Hospital in the village of that name on the coast a few
miles south of Hiroshima. During the great typhoon of September 17, a landslide
roared down from the steep hills behind the hospital to the sea, crushing several
buildings in its path and carrying to their deaths ten ofthe finest medical scientists in
Japan, including the famous hematopathologist, Professor Sugiyama.
Among some of these groups of investigators there existed a certain jealousy of
what might be called intellectual property, and communications among them were
not free. Such attitudes are not unique to Japan but tend to prevail among scientific
communities throughout the world. With a few major exceptions, these teams con-
sidered particular aspects of the problems in hand. Under difficult circumstances,
the generally high quality of the studies performed is remarkable.
ORGANIZING AN AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT
In retrospect, it seems strange that a well-staffed and well-equipped medical team
had not been organized by General Kirk, the Surgeon General ofthe U.S. Army, for
the specific function ofperforming an intensive investigation ofbiological effects of
the atomic bomb. It was said that the Surgeon General had not been informed ofthe
planned employment of this weapon against the cities. Furthermore, General Kirk's
personal relationships with General MacArthur were reported to be strained. We
know that he had, during his tour of the Western Pacific in 1945, been refused per-
mission to land in the Philippines. Rumor had it that years earlier when Kirk was in
command of amilitary hospitalinthe Philippineshe had declinedto admitMacArthur
as a patient because the latter was then serving in a civilian capacity.
The need for a thoroughgoing medical study was clearly perceived by Dr. Ashley
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W. Oughterson, then serving as surgical consultant to General MacArthur. Since he
knew of no preparations that had been made from Washington, he conceived a plan
of action while still on shipboard with GHQ on route to Japan. This was presented
as a letter and immediately approved by Dr. Guy B. Denit, Chief Surgeon, GHQ,
U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific. Dr. Oughterson laid down the major directions
that were actually pursued by the investigating team in his memorandum. The perti-
nent portions are as follows:
1. A study ofthe effects ofthe two atomic bombs used in Japan is ofvital impor-
tance. This unique opportunity may not again be offered. Plans for recording
all available data therefore should receive first priority.
2. The effects of these bombs should be studied at the earliest possible moment
because:
a. Much of the data must be obtained from interrogation ofthe survivors and
the sooner this is accomplished the more accurate will be the results.
b. Postmortem examination of the dead may provide valuable information as
to the cause of death. Three weeks or more will have elapsed and oppor-
tunity for postmortem examination will be limited to late deaths among
survivors. It is hoped that some postmortem examinations may have been
done by the Japanese and that these records may be amplified by early in-
terrogation of the Japanese pathologists.
c. Accurate case histories correlated with physical findings and laboratory ex-
aminations may provide the most reliable data.
d. Residual radiation effects have been suggested as a possible source of
danger and this should be investigated at the earliest possible date.
3. Scope ofthe study: The total number ofcasualties reported at Hiroshimais ap-
proximately 160,000, of whom 8,000 are dead. The scope of the problem is
such as to require the organization of teams with interpreters in order to com-
plete an adequate study within a reasonable time limit. These teams should
include pathologists and clinicians working under the direction of trained in-
vestigators.
4. It is suggested that an attempt be made to obtain the following data:
a. Location of all casualties, living or dead, should be determined in relation
to the bomb and plotted on a contour map.
b. All living casualties should be identified by number for location on the map
and an exact description of the case kept in a cross-index file.
c. The position or protection of all casualties should be determined since this
may be a determining factor in blast effects and burns.
d. Evidence ofblast effect, burns, healing rate, cause ofdamage (i.e., whether
primarily due to the bomb or secondary to burning buildings, flying debris,
falling walls, etc.) and cause of death should be recorded.
e. While there is little indication that a residual effect of radiation will cause
injury, it should nevertheless receive serious consideration.
f. Complete postmortem examination should be performed on all injured in
whom the cause of death is not clearly established.
g. It is hoped that the Japanese may have already organized an investigation
of the casualties. Much valuable data may be obtained from interrogation
ofJapanese doctors and pathologists. Also data from anegative standpoint
may be obtained from uninjured survivors who were within the danger
zone.
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After the GHQ group landed in Japan on September 1, 1945, it was learned that
various groups of Japanese scientists had already conducted medical investigations
on the patients in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Contact was established with the
Japanese Government on September 3, and thereafter reports were received and
liaison maintained through the GHQ Surgeon's Office.
At about this time a group from the "Manhattan District," the organization that
carried the responsibility for developing the atomic bomb, arrived in Japan. Its mis-
sion was to conduct a brief preliminary study of the effects for an immediate report
to Washington. The major function was to determine whether there was residual
radioactivity in order to safeguard our troops. In charge of the medical section of
this group was Dr. Stafford L. Warren, whose civilian position was that of Pro-
fessor of Radiology at the University of Rochester, who was well known to Dr.
Oughterson from civilian life. At a conference on September 4, 1945, it was agreed
that it was desirable to unify the information to be obtained in a joint medical
report. The group made a preliminary survey of physical damage and of casualties in
various hospitals and clinics. After the physicists had confirmed that only minimal
radioactivity, well within the limits of safety, was present, the group returned to
Tokyo. There was only one localized but intense focus of radioactivity in the ashes
of one of the crematories, which was traced to a radium source that had been used
for treating a uterine tumor.
INITIATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE STUDIES:
FORMATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION
It was obvious that for an intensive medical study the cooperation of the
Japanese, who had already made all of the clinical and laboratory observations dur-
ing the height of the early phase, was essential. Professor Masao Tsuzuki, the Head
ofthe Department of Surgery of the Tokyo Imperial University and Director of the
Medical Division of the Japanese Research Council, was contacted. He agreed to
enlist the full cooperation of Japanese medical scientists. As a result General
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander, directed the formation of a "Joint Commis-
sion for the Investigation of the Medical Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan."
This was to include the Manhattan District Group while still in Japan; a GHQ study
group still to be organized, which was to perform a more definitive medical study;
and the Japanese Government Group under Professor Tsuzuki. Later, on
September 25, there arrived a medical investigating team of U.S. Navy personnel
under Dr. Shields Warren, which was assigned to Nagasaki. With their arrival it was
obvious that duplication or conflict of effort would be ridiculous and the Navy
group then worked as part of the Joint Commission in full cooperation with the
U.S. Army and Japanese components in Nagasaki.
On September 18, 1945, members of the 39th General Hospital, the Yale Unit,
stationed on Saipan in the Mariana Islands, received orders to proceed to Japan to
assist in studies of the effect of the atomic bomb. Those involved included Dr.
Liebow, a pathologist; Dr. Jack D. Rosenbaum, a specialist in metabolic diseases;
Dr. George V. LeRoy; and sergeants John Archimbault and Jack Reed, laboratory
technicians. Dr. Herman Tarnower, an internist who had been stationed on Guam,
joined the group en route. Although the team departed on September 18, they did
not arrive in Tokyo until late on the afternoon ofSeptember 21. The delay was partly
due to the overtaxed state of military transport and the need to break the trip down
into short hops. It was also in part because General MacArthur had forbidden any
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planes except those of the U.S. Army to land at the Tokyo airfield. Since the only
transportation available was in naval planes, the group was forced to land across the
harbor from Tokyo and was ferried then, by marine airforce planes, to Yokohama,
whence they were driven to Tokyo. The trip skirted the eastern and southern
margins of the typhoon which struck Hiroshima on September 21 and resulted in
destruction of the Ono Hospital, as described earlier.
On the afternoon of September 23, the team of investigators met at the Surgeon's
Office of General Headquarters with Dr. Bruce Webster, of Cornell, who provided
living quarters and administrative support. That night, a conference was held with
Dr. Oughterson, who had just returned from Hiroshima and was able to inform the
group of the results of the preliminary survey carried out jointly by the Army and
the delegation from the Manhattan District under the direction ofDr. StaffordWar-
ren, who had been in charge of the medical department of the Manhattan Project
throughout its existence. At this meeting, the mission ofthe group was defined clearly
for the first time, and the team was given its assignment.
The group was divided into two teams: one, under the direction of Dr. Verne R.
Mason, was assigned to Hiroshima and the other, led by Dr. Elbert DeCoursey,
would study the problems at Nagasaki. Liebow and Rosenbaum would work at
Hiroshima and LeRoy and Tarnower would go to Nagasaki. The Hiroshima con-
tingent was later expanded by the arrivals of Drs. Philip Loge, Milton Kramer,
Samuel Berg, and Calvin Koch. The chief representative of the Japanese medical
establishment was Dr. Tsuzuki, Professor of Surgery at Tokyo Imperial University,
previously Admiral in the Japanese Navy, and Director of the Medical Division of
the Japanese Research Council. Colonel Mason, a graduate of Johns Hopkins, was
one ofthe senior medical consultants in the Pacific Theater. Colonel DeCoursey, an
outstanding pathologist, was later to become Director ofthe Armed Forces Institute
ofPathology. At that time, he was consultant in charge oflaboratories in the Pacific
Theater and was the only regular army officer assigned to the group.
A preliminary briefing by Captain Nolan, a representative of the Manhattan
District, indicated that a Japanese officer, Major Motohashi, who was then con-
valescing in Tokyo, was familiar with the fate of the troops who had been stationed
in Hiroshima at the time of the blast. He was to provide valuable information for
later evaluation. The absence of residual radioactivity on the ground was also con-
firmed. The group reviewed a preliminary nine-page report of Japanese observers
from the Ujina Branch Hospital, which described 500 patients who were received
immediately after the blast. Those who had suffered burns and had been within the
"zone of radiation injury" had a much worse prognosis than burned patients at a
distance from ground zero. Most of the patients within the danger area developed
alopecia within ten days of the blast, and within fourteen days had fever, hemor-
rhages, diarrhea, and leukopenia. Most of the victims who had been within 1,000
meters of the explosion died, usually with multiple petechial hemorrhages and bowel
damage. The report included descriptions of autopsies performed by Dr. M.
Miyake, Professor of Pathology at Tokyo Imperial University. An important ele-
ment of this report was a map ofHiroshima, locating the position ofthe patients at
the time of the explosion. This early Japanese report was later expanded to a much
longer and more detailed version produced by the personnel of the Tokyo First
Military Hospital and the Tokyo Imperial University, which was communicated to
the American members of the Joint Commission on the Biological Effects of the
Atomic Bomb. Most of the material was incorporated into reports of that body.
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Dr. Tsuzuki met with the American investigators later on September 21, and
assured them that he would provide both medical manpower and equipment for the
study, since no American laboratory equipment or supplies were then available. He
also agreed to coordinate and transmit to the American team the information being
developed by the Japanese physicians caring for the many patients still hospitalized
with aplastic anemia.
An early decision had tobemade about the forms onwhich datawould berecorded.
Dr. Oughterson, who had been one of the founders of the Connecticut Cancer
Registry, was familiar with the design of forms which would make interpretation of
the data as simple as possible. He drafted an abbreviated record contained on both
sides of a single sheet of paper. Names were recorded both in Japanese and in
English transliteration, but it later became apparent that this form of identification
was inadequate. Transcription of Japanese names into English was not reproduci-
ble, and the lack of a record of the person's home address made identification more
difficult. The form also included the location of the subject at the time of the ex-
posure, the form of the injury, the dates of onset and cessation of symptoms, and
factors affecting radiation exposure such as protectiveclothing and location relative
to protective buildings. The problem of differentiating burns caused by the explo-
sion from those caused by fire was discussed. It later turned out that the definition
of "epilation" also caused some difficulties in separating that resulting from radia-
tion from that caused by thermal injury. In the case of "hemorrhage," there was a
problem in separating the effects ofradiation from that oftrauma. Ultimately these
problems had to be handled by the individual interviewers. In spite of these dif-
ficulties, only 35 duplications were found in over 6,000 records and, in general, the
data recorded appeared to be reproducible and adequately accurate.
Dr. Tsuzuki consulted with the senior Japanese and American clinicians and a
decision was made to assign 25 Japanese physicians of various specialties to the
team. Fourteen were sent to Hiroshima, since it was correctly anticipated that the
load of work would be greater in that city, and the remainder to Nagasaki. Dr. Kiku
Nakao, a young hematologist who had already begun a study of bone marrow and
peripheral blood smears from patients at Hiroshima, was also assigned to that city.
He later worked at the Argonne National Laboratory and became Professor of
Medicine at Tokyo National University. The other Japanese at Hiroshima included
four internists and a pathologist, radiobiologist, surgeon, oncologist, and pediatri-
cian. A map of Hiroshima supplied by Dr. Tsuzuki was overprinted with English
names and with circles centered on ground zero at 500-meter intervals up to 3,000
meters and at 1,000 meters for two additional rings. These were intercepted by radii
from the hypocenter which delineated a total of 25 zones (Fig. 2). Many copies of
these maps and thousands of record forms were assembled, along with the equip-
ment which had been donated by the Japanese medical establishment for shipment
to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Supplies for the laboratory proved to be a serious problem. The American
military establishment initially could supply only minimal housekeeping supplies
and field items such as DDT and insecticides. Some laboratory glassware was found
in a wrecked analytical unit previously used bythe Japanese foranalyzing fish meal.
Finally, an obliging sergeant at the 268th Quartermaster Battalion warehouse per-
mitted the party to sign out most of what they needed, even though official requisi-
tions had not been issued. Much additional equipment and supplies were provided
by Tokyo University. Many technical reference books were contributed from the
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FIG. 2. Map ofHiroshima used in the initial survey by the Joint Commission, over-printed with circles
centered on the hypocenter. The inner five rings have radii increasing at 500-meter intervals and the outer
two at 1,000 meters.
personal libraries of the faculty. Preparations were essentially completed by
September 25, at which time the Nagasaki contingent departed from Tokyo; but the
damage produced by the typhoon made both air and rail travel to Hiroshima im-
possible until October 12. In spite ofthis delay, work was begun at once on review-
ing the clinical records and the peripheral blood, marrow, and autopsy slides of 44
patients provided by Dr. Nakao.
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INITIATION OF THE HIROSHIMA STUDY
The airport at Hiroshima had been essentially destroyed. The only facility, aside
from a rutted, muddy field, was a single wind sock. The team was greeted, among
others, by some badly scarred children, one of whom spoke English and could
describe accurately to the Americans where he had been relative to the bomb. From
the air, the entire city had seemed to be completely flat except for some concrete
buildings that looked reasonably well-preserved, but on closer inspection it was
found to be littered with twisted and buckled masses. The roads were littered with
wreckage of every description, including many burned-out trucks and cars. Charred
utility poles had collapsed and jumbled wires criss-crossed the path. Everywhere
there was evidence of a conflagration. Toward the margin of the city, unburned
houses had been flattened, as if by wind, all in the same direction away from the
center of the explosion.
The group was quartered about 4.5 kilometers from the hypocenter in the living
quarters ofthe Daiwa Rayon Mills in Ujina, which had been taken over as a hospital
by the Tokyo First Military Hospital. The buildings, long, two-story, barrack-like
structures arranged in cantonment style off straight covered walks, were assigned to
the Joint Commission. The group now consisted of six American and 15 Japanese
physicians, four American enlisted men, and 21 Japanese medical students. The
laboratory was set up and clinical investigation of patients began on October 15,
taking histories, performing physical examinations, and doing clinical laboratory
work on patients in the Ujina area. The American physicians were impressed by the
absence of facilities for clinical support, since blood transfusion, electrolyte solu-
tions, penicillin, and even late forms of the sulfa drugs were not available. After the
initial examination of the patients in the Ujima hospital, teams were sent to other
hospitals and outpatient departments in Hiroshima. Records and laboratory
specimens were brought back to the Ujina headquarters.
It was not difficult to obtain an adequate sample of bomb victims who were still
sick enough to require hospital or outpatient care, but obtaining data from those
who had had only minor injuries was a problem. Many of these had left Hiroshima
temporarily, and others had moved from their previous homes, which had been
damaged by the blast. Some of them had been in the city temporarily on August 6
and had returned to their farms or houses in the periphery of the city. The
Hiroshima police cooperated by locating about 150 to 200 suitable people from all
quarters of the city.
The initial survey proceeded rapidly, since the team was capable of obtaining in-
formation from as many as 300 patients a day. Studies of the laboratory and patho-
logical material were much slower. All of the Japanese data had to be translated
to English. In some instances, this required translation into German (which was the
second language of some of the Japanese doctors) and re-translation by Dr. Liebow
into English.
OBTAINING A VALID SAMPLING OF THE POPULATION
The original study had been planned without any particular number of patients in
mind. By early November, Dr. Oughterson set a goal of5,000, but later consultation
with statisticians led to the decision to attempt to obtain twice that number. This
large group could not be obtained by random recruiting, so the study team obtained
cooperation from schools and factories, which allowed their records to be examined
and students or workers to be interviewed. This information, combined with careful
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FIG. 3. The general casualty and mortality curves at Hiroshima as determined from the
population study. Against the general curve are shown mortality figures from two groups of
manual laborers at Otake. The upper group (Xl) were in the open on a river bank and suffered
both burns and radiation injury and the lower group (X2) were shielded from burns by being in
the shadow of Japanese houses, although not protected from the radiation effect.
studies ofthelocation ofthe subjects at thetime ofthe blast and ofthe nature ofthe
protection provided by buildings, foliage, and clothing permitted calculation of the
penetrating ability of the radiation and the shielding effect of various types of
materials. The specific information was supplemented by a survey based on the na-
tional census taken in November 1945. Of the 523 precincts in the city, 265 were
selected at random anda five-percent subsample ofthis base was obtained. This sub-
sample was surveyed to determine location at the time ofthe bomb and ultimate sur-
vival both of the person named in the census and of relatives in the city. After
screening to eliminate duplication, information about 20,586 subjects was available.
From these materials it was ultimately possible to calculate the killing efficacy ofthe
bomb and shielding potency ofvarious materials. It was also possible to construct a
curve relating biological damage to distance from the bomb (Fig. 3). The survey in-
dicated that of the total population of about 253,000 25.5 percent (64,000 persons)
had been killed by the bomb, 27 percent (68,400) had been injured, and 47.5 percent
had escaped physically unscathed. (These figures differed somewhat from those of
the Japanese, who reported that 92,138 were dead or missing six months after the
bomb and 54,407 were injured, of a total population of 306,545. Thus the Japanese
found 30 percent killed or missing and 18 percent injured [2].)
COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION
The mission was completed in late November, and the records, slides, and
photographs dispatched on November 26 to the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology where the final report was to be prepared. The material included over
1,500 photographs, tissues and protocols of 139 autopsies, and the population data
mentioned above. Studies continued of the effects of the bomb and ofthe radiation
associated with it on the population exposed and on a control, unexposed popula-
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tion as a collaborative effort ofthe Japanese and American services. Liebow returned
to the United States in January 1946, and was assigned to the Armed Forces Institute
ofPathology where he assisted in preparation of the report ofthe work ofthe Com-
mission. The final report, in six volumes containing 1,300 pages, was completed on
September 6, 1946.
One of Liebow's last official actions was to write a letter for Dr. Oughterson's
signature, urging the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to make
arrangements to continue the studies of the effects of the bomb. The request was
transmitted to the National Research Council and was a major stimulus to organiz-
ing the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, which continued the work ofthe Com-
bined Commission.
Dr. Liebow concluded his diary with the following words:
The use of this weapon as we contemplated it, and then more when we saw
its effects, and then even as we wrote of it, filled us with revulsion. We ac-
quired a sympathy, not for those on the periphery who acquired a Pro-
metheus complex and cried mea culpa as a means of proclaiming their own
importance, but for the physicists who bore the real responsibility for the
development of the atomic bomb and who suffered genuine torment of con-
science. Were we, even in the aftermath, accessories to a crime against
mankind? Surely death and injury of innocents is wickedness that can never
be condoned. But even killing by hand, in combat, while honoring the tradi-
tions of"chivalry" is still murder. The crime is ofthe samekind. Chivalrywas
crushed and burned when the first unseeing stones and firebrands were hurled.
It had died centuries before Hiroshima. We thought also of the 15,000
hospital beds in the Marianas now never to be used, and of the hundreds of
thousands of lives, American and Japanese, that would have been the cost of
the assault and conquest of the home islands of Japan. Had more been
spared than were lost and maimed in the two cities? But why could not an
atomic explosion, near but not upon, a living city, have been as persuasive?
Even if it was "necessary" to destroy one city, how could one justify the
devastation of another? We could only hope that reasons based on morality
as well as strategy dictated the decisions.
When we saw the pitifully crippled and maimed we felt both guilt and
shame. But was the absence of resentfulness the stoicism of a brave and
disciplined people or was this also some reflection ofguilt on their own part?
Perhaps there was an element of both.
But once the deed was done, criminal or salutary, there was clearly a duty
to perform: to measure not merely the power of a weapon soon to become
outmoded or extinct, but the nature and extent of radiation injury in man.
Never before had human beings been exposed en masse to this force that
surely would have to be lived with, or even lived by. This power could be
harnessed for good although it would always carry a threat. In performing
this work, we could then, not merely unthinkingly obey orders, but make a
partial and uneasy peace with conscience. While the opportunity was born of
tragedy, it was clearly a necessity to make the best use ofit. We plunged into
the task with an inner compulsion for we knew that time was running out.
The work could surely have been done much better by a team selected in ad-
vance and equipped with all the instruments of modern laboratory science.
As it was, much less would have been accomplished without the expert
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knowledge, ingenuity, ideas, and unflagging efforts of our Japanese col-
leagues.
When on September 6, 1946, the completed report of some 1,300 pages,
bound in six substantial volumes, was handed to Col. Ash, there ended a still
vivid chapter. But while the chapter came to an end we were left with the
uneasy feeling that the book remains unfinished-and it continues as a haunt-
ing memory. May the evil of which it tells never come back!
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